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It is an accepted fact that the process of internation-
alization of the world economy has expanded con-
siderably in the last few decades. The author begins 
by examining the historical background of this 
process, and after emphasizing that it is not limited 
to the economic sphere —since it is also seen in the 
international dissemination of ideas, institutions and 
ways of life— he goes on to analyse in particular 
the economic internationalization recorded since 
the Second World War. After thus defining his 
subject, he reviews various expressions of interna-
tionalization in trade, capital movements, invest-
ments, the activities of transnational enterprises, and 
so on, with special attention to the way in which 
this process has influenced the periphery. 
Taking this analysis as his basis, he concludes 
that internationalization has continued to be cen-
tered around the developed countries, and that the 
periphery has only participated in it in a partial 
and selective manner, thus preventing it from being 
transformed into the image and likeness of the 
developed capitalist countries. This has been largely 
due to the fact that the internationalization process 
has taken place in an international economic struc-
ture in which the centres set their stamp on the 
system as a whole and impart their own type of 
dynamism to it. In these circumstances, it is clear 
that the long-lived system of centre-periphery rela-
tions cannot change through the expansion of the 
present internationalization process and that this 
can only be achieved by making substantial changes 
in the manner in which the periphery is incorporated 
in the world economy. 
a) A brief historical sketch 
Among the waves of interest in particular 
subjects which periodically arise and predomi-
nate in the general discussion, few in recent 
times have been more vigorous and wide-
spread than that regarding the "internation-
alization" of the world economy. 
As usually happens, it was a few traumatic 
episodes —the world monetary crisis which 
burst upon us at the beginning of this decade, 
the parallel rapid increase in the prices of many 
primary commodities, followed a little later by 
the radical change in the price of oil, together 
with the beginning of a phase of "stagflation" 
in the central countries which has cast its 
shadow over the entire world scene —which 
gave rise to general awareness of this harsh 
underlying reality. 
Although this matter clearly goes beyond 
the scope of the present modest study —as is 
shown by the mountains of documents written 
about it— it might be worth identifying and 
systematizing some of its main aspects in order 
to understand it better.* 
In order to place this study on a systematic 
basis, the general features of the phenomenon 
will be examined and an attempt will be made 
to bring out their continuity and the elements 
of change and novelty with regard to tenden-
cies which have old historical roots. The aim 
is to see if they have modified the basic 
structure of the centre-periphery system and, 
in particular, if there has been a change in the 
links between the two spheres and in this 
system's representation of the world economy. 
We will not go into the question of this inter-
dependence in depth, however, except in a few 
special aspects and in drawing up the final 
balance. Further on, we shall examine in 
greater detail the progress of Latin American 
internationalization since the war, the pro-
blems it raises, and the options which are to 
be glimpsed for the future. 
The primary sense of the process under 
consideration could not be clearer and goes 
back, as everyone knows, to a past which is 
now far removed, at least from the viewpoint 
of present-day society. It corresponds to and 
'Director of the Economic Development Division of 
CEPAL. 
Ut should be noted that a necessarily selective cri-
terion has been adopted with regard to the background 
information and bibliography used. 
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is expressed through the gradual and many-
faceted process of assembly of the various local, 
regional, national, continental and other 
components of the world jigsaw puzzle. Origi-
nally set in motion by the great imperial 
structures of yore and of more recent times, 
the exploits of sailors, explorers and colonizers, 
the progress of science and technology and the 
dissemination of religious and political beliefs, 
it took an important leap forward with the 
advent of commercial and industrial capita-
lism. By way of technology, trade, the profit 
motive and competition and —when neces-
sary— the undisguised use of force, this histo-
rical formation assails either directly, indi-
rectly or surreptitiously all the secluded areas, 
particular features and enclaves of whatever 
type, unleashing pressures which tend towards 
a growing interlinkage and —within certain 
limits and characteristics to which we shall 
refer later— homogenization of the various 
pieces making up international society. 
The two great nineteenth century currents 
of thought in this field, the classical liberal 
and the Marxist approaches, shared to a con-
siderable extent some basic assumptions 
regarding these tendencies and consequences, 
although they differed radically in their critical 
appraisal of these.2 
2 Summing up the criterion of the first group, Professor 
Rosenstein-Rodan noted in an admirably lucid study that: 
"The classical doctrine was based on the principle of 
competition and the mobility ofcapital. The poor countries 
had abundant labour bu t were short ofcapital. Wages were 
low, and it was of advantage for capitalists to invest in 
these countries and take advantage of this fact. Interna-
tional movements of capital would be oriented towaids 
areas where there was abundant cheap labour, and so, in 
the long run, they would tend to reduce the differences 
in real wage levels" ("Las razones del atraso económico", 
in Panorama económico (Santiago, Chile), N.° 94, Febru-
ary 1954). 
The founders of Marxism, for their part, in one of the 
most widely disseminated documents of that ideology, saw 
the world repercussions of capitalist dynamics in different 
terms: In exploiting the world market they said, the 
bourgeoisie has imparted a cosmopolitan nature to the 
production and consumption of all countries, so that 
instead of the old system whereby needs were satisfied 
by the countries ' own production, new needs arise which 
have to be satisfied with products from the remotest 
regions and climes. In the place of the old isolation and 
local and national autarky, unlimited traffic and the 
To a certain extent, these visions did 
materialize, but the manifest and significant 
internationalization which took place was very 
far from disseminating to all points in the globe 
the logic and structures of industrial capitalism, 
and still less did it promote the homogeneiza-
tion of production systems and social condi-
tions. Rosenstein-Rodan summed up the 
balance sheet of this opening phase of the 
centre-periphery complex in the following 
terms:3 
"Between 1815 and 1914 we had an excep-
tional century of peace, which is quite a long 
time even for classical economists and during 
which technical and economic progress was 
stupendous. During this century all the pos-
tulates of the classical economists were com-
plied with: minimal government intervention, 
free trade, high international investment and, 
what is more, not only the free movement of 
capital but also great mobility of the labour 
factor in the form of international migrations. 
"The first part of the predictions of the classical 
economists was fulfilled, in that the century 
did witness a great increase in wealth. The 
second part proved blatantly unfounded, 
however, since most of the increase in wealth 
was enjoyed by only 30% of the world popula-
tion, with the other two-thirds remaining as 
poor as before."4 
This period, which coincides with the rise 
and fall of the so-called "Pax Britannica", 
ended with the First World War and the Great 
Depression, which involved —among other 
things— the paralyzation and subsequent 
retreat of the tendencies towards integration 
as well as of those towards fragmentation into 
different more or less exclusive areas of in-
fluence of the great capitalist powers. 
b) The internationalization of the post-war 
period 
After the prolonged interregnum which began 
with the First World War, was accentuated with 
in terdependence of the nations have been introduced 
(Communist manifesto, 1848). 
3Rosenstein-Rodan, op. cit. This analysis forms part 
of his concept of the so-called "big push". See in this 
respect H. Ellis (éd.), Economic Development for Latin 
America, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961. 
4 I t hardly seems necessary to note the similarity 
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the Great Depression—after the brief recovery 
during part of the 1920s— and closed with the 
dawning of peace in 1945, the process of 
internationalization began again on a more 
extensive and dynamic level, covering the 
period up to the mid-1970s, when the traumatic 
events referred to earlier checked its further 
progress and gave rise to serious uncertainty 
as to the nature of its subsequent development. 
The resumption of this historical tendency 
took various paths and operated at all levels. 
As in the past, while tending towards the 
horizontal articulation of the most developed 
economies it did the same thing in a vertical 
direction, drawing the periphery into this 
process, and while nation-States are obviously 
its main protagonists, there are other actors 
—such as transnational enterprises— which 
play roles of growing importance in which they 
back u p and sometimes, as has happened more 
recently, even surpass or take the place of the 
first-named actors, all of this in a dynamic and 
contradictory play of congruences and con-
flicts. 
Furthermore, this historical tendency 
deploys itself through the most varied chan-
nels . Although a sound case can be put forward 
for claiming that its main fulcrum was formed 
by the changes in the system of production 
and the corresponding international linkages, 
it is also true that there are other important 
circumstances connected with this, which 
warrant a quick glance before devoting our-
selves to our real field of analysis. 
(c) The political and ideological factor 
O n e of these circumstances, although not 
always prized at its true value, is the political 
dimension and, more specifically, the multiple 
incidences of the so-called "cold war". 
This phenomenon is, it is true, apparently 
contradictory. Viewed from the most usual 
angle, it appears as a factor of division and 
dispute between basic segments of the world 
between this reasoning and that set forth by Raúl Prebisch 
in the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949 (United 
Nations publication, Sales N.°: E.51.II.G.1) regarding the 
slow and irregular propagation of technical progress from 
the countries which generate it to the rest of the world. 
conglomerate, but at the same time it plays 
an undoubted role as an agglutinating factor, 
both of the blocks which are in dispute and 
within them (for example, the formal and de 
facto integration of Western Europe and the 
corresponding situation on the Eastern Euro-
pean socialist side),5 to say nothing of other 
repercussions along the same lines such as the 
grouping of the "non-aligned countries". 
Among the few who have correctly eval-
uated the significance of this situation and of 
the possible implications of subsequent enten-
te is that great thinker José Medina Echavarria. 
Therefore, in spite of its length, it is worth 
reproducing one of the propositions that he 
set forth in a challenging work published 
shortly before his lamented death:6 
"Thus , the way the cold war fitted together 
is a phenomenon which is easily visible and 
can be grasped with the greatest clarity. And 
the same is true both for the main protagonists 
and for the third parties involved. A situation 
arose in which, just as in the lasting social 
stratification of the Ancien Régime, everybody 
was perfectly conscious of the place he should 
and in fact did occupy. All the forms of internal 
or external, national and international conduct 
only exist and can be understood as obvious in 
the light of the inevitably present antagonism. 
This is so up to the point that when in certain 
years some countries define themselves as non-
aligned, they do not need to declare the 
meaning of this nor ask what it means to 
abandon the ranks. The clear, sharp confronta-
tion between the two superpowers brought 
with it a similar clarity or absence of doubt in 
the positions of allies and satellites, although 
sometimes among the latter there were those 
who were neither beloved nor sought. For this 
reason, it is necessary to bear clearly in mind 
the lineal expression of the profiles of the socio-
political structure of the cold war in order to 
understand immediately the confusion pro-
5The Chinese-Soviet conflict represented a substantial 
inversion of this process, but at the same time it implied the 
.development of other links by China, now with the 
Western powers and Japan, and perhaps in the future with 
South-East Asia. 
6José Medina Echavarria, "Latin America in the 
possible scenarios oí détente", in CEPAL Review, N.° 2, 
second half of 1976, p. 22. 
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duced when attempts to eliminate it or dimin-
ish it lead to the introduction of shades of 
colour in the depiction of its features." 
Let us repeat in passing —because of the 
importance which this has for the analysis 
below— that the phenomenon of the "cold 
war" is an essential ingredient for the dyna-
mism and the unity of the central economies, 
since it relegates to a minor position obstacles 
and disputes which were previously of great 
importance.7 
An inevitable concomitant of this political 
situation has been what might be called "ide-
ological internationalization". Of course, this is 
not a completely novel phenomenon, and it 
would be impossible to ignore, for example, the 
distant reflections of the Enlightenment and of 
the French and Russian revolutions. Its mod-
ern version, however, has acquired such scope 
and extension —both geographical and social— 
that it dwarfs everything that went before it. 
Thus it was that even in the furthermost and 
darkest corners of the earth, with peoples and 
economies at various pre-feudal stages and 
structures, the ruling circles and sometimes 
also the masses began to unite and struggle for 
categories historically rooted in European so-
ciety, such as liberal democracy, socialism, or 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. This subtle 
but incisive form of imperialism, responsible 
for so many errors and distortions on the 
periphery, represents a chapter of the present 
state of affairs which has been little studied, in 
spite of its enormous importance.8 
7 With reference to this matter, Herbert Marcuse put 
forward the shrewd and provocative thesis that while it is 
ev iden t that there are many contradictions between the 
imperialist powers which it is not necessary to list in detail, 
it is not likely that these contradictions will give rise to 
wars be tween the capitalist countries in the future. This is 
one of the respects in which coexistence shows how 
decisively important it is for the stabilization of capitalism. 
U p to a certain point, it can b e maintained without the 
slightest cynicism that in reality Communism has become 
t h e doctor sitting at the bedside of capitalism (although it 
remains to see exactly in what sense). Without Commu-
nism, it would be difficult to explain the economic and 
political unification of the capitalist world: a unification 
which more or less seems to be the materialization of the 
old Marxist spectre of the worldwide cartel. It shoud be 
noted, moreover, that this integration of the capitalist world 
is not something superficial but rests on an extraordinaria 
real economic base (from Industrial society and Marxism). 
^China's "own way", which claimed to be different 
(d) The transmission of the consumerist 
way of life 
Another aspect which enters into the present 
discussion and is familiar to all is the dissemi-
nation and copying of the ways of life, the 
mores, of the central societies. More specifi-
cally, this means the transfer and absorption of 
their consumption patterns, which become the 
supreme objective of those enthralled by their 
influence. In other words, this concerns the 
recurring theme of the demonstration effect 
and the giddy "consumerist" spiral which is its 
most striking result. 
This internationalization of habits and 
aspirations, as well as constituting another 
basic ingredient in the overall process, is 
relatively independent, it should be noted, of 
the production substrate and the levels and 
changes of the economic structure. Although 
the motive force and the effective social inci-
dence are naturally different, the winds which 
carry this phenomenon blow just as strongly in 
a small Central American country as in Argen-
tina, Algeria, the Philippines or Nigeria, and 
they even reach the socialist world, although of 
course only to a limited extent. In short, as we 
shall see later on, the internationalization of 
consumption patterns advances much more 
rapidly than that of modes of production.9 As 
Raúl Prebisch recently noted: "...The periph-
ery is by no means backward in the propagation 
from the ways of both the capitalist West and the USSR, 
actually fell —despite the original contributions of Mao 
Tse-Tung— within strict Marxist orthodoxy, although the 
actual socioeconomic practice was more or less heretical in 
fundamental aspects in comparison with the European 
socialist or capitalist experiences. 
T h e new circumstances of China's external links and 
internal "modernization" have naturally considerably 
modified this picture. 
See in this respect the reflections of Celso Furtado in 
Creativídade e Dependencia, Rio de Janeiro, Editorial Paz 
e Terra, 1978. 
9 This is not the place to go into the implications and 
problems of this dissociation, which in any case has been 
dealt with on a number of occasions in CEPAL studies. In 
these, emphasis has been placed on the great contradiction 
underlying the attempt to reproduce the consumption 
structure characteristic of the central economies in coun-
tries whose low average level of income (and productivity) 
is only a small fraction of that which is usual in the former. 
Herein lies one of the main causes of the tendencies 
towards concentration of income and the inevitable passing 
over of the basic needs of the majority. 
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and irradiation of the more and more techni-
cally more advanced patterns of consumption. 
Consumption —the consumer society— is 
therefore being rapidly internationalized, 
whereas in contrast formidable obstacles are 
encountered by the internationalization of 
production from the standpoint of foreign 
trade."10 
Paraphrasing a well-known statement, it 
could be said that something similar is happen-
ing at the international level to what is taking 
place in national circles, in the sense that the 
leading society —not the leading class any 
longer— sanctifies and imposes its values and 
habits beyond its own frontiers, with greater or 
lesser force depending on the permeability of 
the local situations. 
This is not a new question, either. In Latin 
America, for example, this topic has been 
frequently discussed ever since last century, 
leading to the coining ofthe well-known saying 
that "we are civilized for consuming but primi-
tive for producing".11 Its present proportions 
and significance, however, show a qualitative 
change with regard to the situation which used 
to exist. 
A significant factor in this, of course, has 
been the formidable progress of the means of 
communication and the part played by the 
transnational enterprises. No further comment 
is called for on this, as it is already sufficiently 
well known, but there are some other factors, 
such as the change in the origin ofthe centres of 
irradiation and the nature and social destina-
tion of a considerable part of the types of 
consumption disseminated, which have re-
ceived less attention. 
Until probably about the time ofthe First 
World War, it was Great Britain and France 
which set the patterns of selective consump-
tion transmitted to the moneyed classes on the 
periphery, but filtration of these patterns to the 
small middle classes and the great masses was 
minimal or non-existent,12 The emergence of 
1 0Dr. Raúl Prebisch, "Socioeconomic structure and 
crisis of peripheral capitalism", CEPAL Review, N.° 6, 
second half of 1978, p . 183. 
u T h e s e words were said by Enrique Molina, the late 
rector and founder of the University of Concepción in 
Chi le , bu t the same idea is repeated in many countries. 
1 2 The leading products in this "él i te" type of consump-
the United States as the leading power radical-
ly changed this picture,13 and the "élite" types 
of consumption were forced into the back-
ground by the consumption of goods of general-
ized and massive use, this being made possible 
by the high level of average income, its more 
equitable distribution (more equitable, that is 
to say, compared with the more highly strati-
fied European societies ofthe pre-war era), the 
size of the market and its vigorous rate of 
expansion. 
The nature and smaller unit values of a 
large part of these goods are associated with the 
growing social diversification observed in the 
peripheral economies, whose growth rates 
were increased and changed by the increase in 
primary exports and complementary activities, 
the expansion of the State machinery, and 
subsequently the advance of industrialization. 
While the higher-income groups continue 
to be the main recipients of this irradiation of 
consumerism —and generally the only ones as 
far as the goods of higher unit value are 
concerned— the new circumstances described 
mean a considerable expansion of the social 
field involved.14 
Thus, the internationalization of consump-
tion patterns is founded upon and expands from 
the basis of a myriad of common goods which 
are repeated in different degrees even in the 
furthest-flung corners of the world and are 
promoted primarily by the great United States 
sales machine, increasingly accompanied by 
similar machines of other countries.15 
tion were a number of well-known goods ranging from 
Limoges or Rosenthal china, Baccarat glassware or Shef-
field cutlery to English textiles, Italian silks and Havana 
cigars. 
1 3See in this respect D. Felix, "Changing consumer 
preference in economic growth", St. Louis, Washington 
University, 1978. 
See C. Filgueira, Consumo y estilos de desarrollo, 
CEPAL, DS/Preliminary Version/190 (mimeo), March 
1979. 
1 5These goods include such items as blue jeans, Coca-
Cola and razor blades; common households appliances, 
chewing gum and deodorants; ice cream, cigarettes, tran-
sistor radios and T-shirts. In addition, within the more 
restricted circle referred to earlier, there are such products 
as motorcars , television sets, etc.: i.e., the costly durables 
which are mainly responsible for the contradiction referred 
to earlier in this study. Finally, in the "cultural" sphere, the 
main harbingers of this trend have been such items as 
comics, jazz, the cinema and the best-seller industry. 
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Although these are the most visible and 
ubiquitous manifestations of this phenomenon, 
care should be taken to avoid a pejorative uni-
lateral appraisal of the nature of the phenom-
ena, as sometimes happens in certain circles. 
Internationalization also makes it possible to 
share in the scientific, technological and cul-
tural riches of the more advanced countries. 
T h e positive nature of these impulses towards 
homogenization is to be seen at the most varied 
levels, from the heights of pure science to the 
progress in everyday technical and produc-
tive activities, to say nothing of the fundamen-
tal contribution to the preservation of life and 
health. The humble aspirin, penicillin or anti-
polio vaccine are vivid illustrations of the 
historic revolution which has taken place in 
this field.16 
We must now end this brief digression on 
some of the less widely covered aspects of this 
question in order to analyse the outstanding 
economic effects of this phenomenon and its 
general significance for the centre-periphery 
system. 
(e) The economic dimensions: 
international trade 
The course of world trade and its performance 
vis-à-vis national products, on the one hand, 
and the evolution of investments and loans on 
the other, are usually considered as the most 
significant phenomena regarding the topic 
under examination, without prejudice to the 
also important role of migrations and of the 
incorporation of the labour force into the world 
system, which we referred to earlier and to 
which we will return at a later point. 
16Radical thinkers of the past, unlike certain present-
day critics, had a very clear picture of the contradictory 
incidences oí internationalization as effected under the 
aegis of industrial capitalism. Among many other referen-
ces, we may recall a well-known reflection of Leon Trotsky 
in his History of the Russian Revolution: "The privilege of 
long-standing backwardness —and this privilege does 
exist— permits and even forces the adoption of any advance 
which is available ... without going through any of the 
intervening stages. Thus, savages changed their bows and 
arrows for riñes, without following the long path which 
existed between these arms in the past". Althouth the 
image used is not perhaps the most felicitous one for 
evoking the comprehensive nature of this phenomenon, it 
does suggest its main features. 
From these two main angles, it is easy to 
see how the tendencies towards international-
ization were intensified in the period after the 
Second World War. 
With regard to the first element, let us look 
at some interesting details from various points 
of view. 
Taking a global view, table 1 shows that 
world exports grew more rapidly than the sum 
of the domestic products and industrial activity 
be tween 1950 and 1970. South America is a 
conspicuous exception to this, since in its case 
the first of these factors shows a smaller 
expansion than the other two. It would there-
fore appear that in this period it represented 
the most typical case of "inward-oriented de-
velopment". It may be noted that even in the 
Soviet Union, where exports were mostly di-
rected to its own sphere of influence, they 
exceeded the performance of the other items, 
while in the case of Asia exports at least exceed 
the increase in the domestic product. 
Table 1 
INDEXES OF EXPANSION OF THE 
WORLD ECONOMY, 1970 
(1950 = 100) 
Gross 






























Source: CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1971 
(United Nations publication, Sales N.°: E.73.II. 
G.l) . 
From another point of view, table 2, which 
covers periods coinciding with the intensi-
fication of this kind of behaviour (1965-1970 
and 1970-1973), reveals that the rate of expan-
sion of exports as a whole with respect to the 
components in question was considerably 
higher than that of production as a whole. The 
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gap is smaller in the group of developing 
countries (although it does increase somewhat 
in 1970-1977), the situation being most marked 
in the case of Latin America, which registers 
the relatively lowest rates of increase of 
exports. 
sectors considered (agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing) show the same tendency, but 
manufacturing is far ahead in the growth of 
exports, for between 1960 and 1977 these grew 
by 326% with respect to the base year, whereas 
agricultural exports only grew by 81%. 
Table 2 
WORLD GROWTH AND TRADE, BY 
MAIN ECONOMIC GROUPINGS 
(Annual growth rates, at constant prices) 
Table 3 
WORLD PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS, 
BY SECTORS, 1960-1977 
1965-1970 1970-1973 Annual growth rate 
Variation 
1960-1977 
1. World as a whole 
Product 5.4 
Exports 9.1 
2. Developed market economies 
Product 4.6 
Exports 9.5 
3. United States 
Product 3.1 
Exports 6.5 






6. Developing countries 
Product 5.9 
Exports 6.8 

















Source: United Nations, World Economic Survey, 1977 
(United Nations publication, Sales N.°: E.78.11. 
G.l) and United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 
1976 (United Nations publication, Sales N.u: E/F. 
77.XVII.1). 
(f) Industrialization and the centralization 
of flows 
"Similar tendencies are observed when the 
problem is considered from a sectoral view-
point, but this has the advantage of bringing in 
a qualitative aspect of the overall evolution 
which is of prime importance for the analysis. 
As will b e noted from table 3, the three main 
Agriculture and stock-raising 
Production 2.5 51 
Exports 3.6 81 
Mining0 
Production 4.3 103 
Exports 5.0 129 
Manufacturing 
Production 6.0 170 
Exports 8.9 326 
Source: FIDE, Buenos Aires, Coyuntura y Desarrollo, 
N.° 5, January 1979, on the basis, of data from 
GATT. 
"Including fuels and non-ferrous metals. 
If we take a broader time horizon, this 
tendency appears even more clearly (see table 
4). In the course of the long and irregular cycle 
be tween 1900 and 1950, world manufacturing 
production expanded at an average rate of 2.8% 
per year, whereas external trade only increased 
by 1.7% per year. Between 1950 and 1975, in 
contrast, manufacturing grew by 6.1% and 
external trade by 8.8% per year; over the same 
period, industrial exports rose from 43.2% to 
64.4% of total trade, and if fuels, whose share 
increased notably after 1973 are excluded, the 
increase is from 48.5% in 1950 to 76% in 
1975.17 
CEPAL, Analysis and prospects of Latin American 
industrial development, ST/CEPAL/Conf. 69/L.2 8 
August 1979. 
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Table 4 
WORLD GROWTH OF INDUSTRY AND 
TRADE IN MANUFACTURES 
(Percentage growth rates) 
1900-1950 1950-1975 
Production of 
manufactures 2.8 6.1 
Trade in 
manufactures 1.7 8.8 
Source: CEPAL, Análisis y estructuras del desarrollo 
industrial latinoamericano, op. cit. 
The preferential action of international-
ization through manufacturing has an obvious 
and well-known result: the growing role of the 
industrialized economies in world trade and 
the increasing importance of the links within 
that group of countries. 
We thus arrive at a clear expression of the 
aspect which is perhaps fundamental in the 
change of structure between the two scenarios 
under consideration: that before the great 
depression (or before the First World War, if 
preferred) and that subsequent to 1945. 
In dealing with this question, Aldo Ferrer 
notes that the growing integration of interna-
tional trade, the movement of capitals and 
emigration were expressed through three main 
channels: the exchange of primary commodi-
ties for manufactures between the centre and 
the periphery; the trade in primary commod-
ities between the industrialized economies, 
and the trade in manufactures between the 
same countries.18 
In the first period, extending up to the First 
World War, the first two channels predomi-
nated to an overwhelming extent, the main 
position, particularly in the field of tropical and 
mineral products, being occupied by the 
centre-periphery flows.19 In the stage after the 
1 8Aldo Ferrer, "América Latina y los países capitalistas 
desarrollados: una perspectiva del modelo centro-perife-
ria", in El Trimestre Económico (Mexico City), N.° 169, 
1975. 
As A. Ferrer says in the study referred to above: "In 
the seventy or eighty years before the Second World War, 
two-thirds of world exports were made up of foodstuffs and 
Second World War, however, it was the third 
form of expansion which predominated. 
In other words, internationalization 
through external trade leads to industrial-
ization on the one hand and centralization on 
the other. 
Some illustrative details were already 
given regarding the first of these. 
With regard to the second of these phe-
nomena, it should be borne in mind that at the 
beginning of the 1970s (1970-1972) trade be-
tween the central economies represented 77% 
of the total (this figure went down slightly in 
subsequent years). At the same time, they 
received around 73% of the exports from the 
periphery and 24% of those from the centrally 
planned economies, the latter figure rising to 
29% in the years 1976-1977.20 
Table 5, for its part, shows the changes in 
the shares of the main groups of countries in 
world trade between 1950 and 1975, the most 
notable features being the increase in the share 
of the central economies from 62 to 66% and the 
drop in the share of the non-oil-exporting 
peripheral countries from 24 to 10%. This table 
also reveals the change among the central 
countries to the detriment of the United States 
and to the advantage of the European Econom-
ic Community and Japan, although this is 
doubtless influenced by conditions in the base 
year, when the post-war reconstruction process 
was hardly beginning. 
This confirms what was already pointed 
out regarding the centripetal tendency of world 
trade and the loss of relative significance of the 
periphery during the period under consid-
eration. 
At the same time, however, it is essential 
to make a distinction between this structural 
variation and the appreciable and generalized 
growth of trade already referred to. Even in the 
case of the underprivileged periphery, the 
raw materials. The period of fastest expansion was between 
1870 and 1913 ... when ... around 70% of European imports 
were made up of primary commodities and nearly two-
thirds of the total imports of the United States —despite its 
formidable endowment with natural resources and capaci-
ty for commodity production— consisted of foodstuffs and 
raw materials". 
^ C E P A L , Economic Survey of Latin America, 1977 
(E/CEPAL/1050/Rev. 1), Santiago, Chile, 1978. 
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Table 5 
SHARES OF MAIN ECONOMIC AREAS 





A, Developed market 
economy countries 60.2 66.3 
United States 16.6 12.2 
Canada 4.7 3.7 
European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
(9 countries) 26.5 33.9 
European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) 
(8 countries) 5.6 6.1 
Japan 1.3 6.4 
Others 5.6 3.8 
B. Centrally planned 
economies 8.1 9.8 
Eastern Europe 6.8 9.0 
Asia 1.3 0.8 
C. Developing countries 31.7 23.9 
Oil-exporting countries 7.3 13.4 
Non-oil-exporting countries 24.4 10.5 
Africa 4.0 1.8 
Latin America 10.4 3.9 
Asia 9.1 4.3 
Middle East 0.8 0.4 
Source: CEPAL, The economic and social development 
and external economic relations of Latin America 
(E/CEPAL/1061), vol. II, 1979. 
drop in its total share did not prevent the 
annual growth rate of its exports from amount-
ing to 7.6% (6.8% for Latin America) in the 
period 1950-1975. This growth rate may be 
compared with that recorded by commodity 
exports in one of the most vigorous phases of 
past growth (1871-1913), when they expanded 
at the rate of 3.5% per year.21 
Strictly speaking, then, that fundamental 
readjustment represents the relative relegation 
of a large part of the periphery to a second 
place, rather than its exclusion from the great 
wave of internationalization through external 
t rade. 2 2 
2 1
 A. Ferrer, op. cit. 
2 2 This appraisal would appear not to be valid, how-
ever, for the countries which the World Bank has classified 
Obviously, the big exception to these 
changes appears after 1973, with the substan-
tial rise in oil prices (see table 5), which will 
be discussed later on. 
Another noteworthy element of undoubt-
ed importance is the growing share of indus-
trial exports by the periphery, which to some 
extent reduce its relative losses.23 
Between 1960 and 1975, at constant prices, 
these exports grew at 12.3% per year, which 
was twice as much as the total exports of those 
countries and also compares favourably with 
the growth rate of world trade in that period, 
which was 7% per year.24 In the case of Latin 
America, this meant that the share of manufac-
tured goods rose from 13% of its exports to 23% 
be tween 1970 and 1975, and this tendency was 
maintained subsequently, despite the deterio-
ration in the international situation25 
It is worth recalling, however, that this 
performance has been limited to a small num-
ber of countries on the periphery : a feature 
which is also to be noted in Latin America, 
although to a smaller extent. 
Without anticipating the recapitulation 
which will be made later on in this study, it 
may be stated that the details given regarding 
international trade not only bring out its signif-
icant role in the development of internation-
alization but also highlight certain changes 
and tendencies which show the different impli-
cations it has for the centres and the periphery. 
as those of lowest income, among which are a number of 
countries with very large populations, such as India (620 
million), Indonesia (80 million), Bangladesh (80 million), 
and Pakistan (71 million). Their exports increased by 3.6% 
per year between 1960 and 1970, but went down by 0.4% 
between 1970 and 1976. See World Development Indica-
tors, Washington, The World Bank, 1978. 
23Professor A. Lewis's optimistic judgement on this 
matter is of interest. In the Evolution of the International 
Economic Order (The Eliot Janeway Lectures, Princeton, 
N. J., Princeton University, 1971), he notes that as far back 
as 1975 manufactures made up 33% of the exports of the 
developing countries (excluding the oil-exporting coun-
tries), and if the present tendency continues, by 1985 they 
will represent more than half. In his view, the division of 
the world into developing countries which export agricul-
tural products and import manufactures and developed 
countries which do the opposite is on the point of ending. 
^ S e e "Thechanging composition of developing coun-
try exports" by H. B. Chenery and D. B. Keesing, in 
World Development Report, 1978. 
2 5 CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1977, 
op. cit. 
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g) The role of movements of capital 
It seems superflous to recall the correlation 
—not necessarily symmetrical—between trade 
flows and capital flows, which, as we already 
noted, constitute the economic rulcrums of the 
internationalization process. 
As regards the second of these, we shall 
limit ourselves to the analysis of direct invest-
ments and their fundamental agents, the trans-
national enterprises, We shall therefore leave 
aside everything connected with financial 
flows, the size and composition of which have 
undergone great changes during this decade. 
Quite apart from the fact that many valuable 
studies have been made on this subject,26 it 
2()See, for example, C. Massad, "The revolt of the 
bankers in the international economy: a world without a 
monetary system", CEPAL Review, N.° 2, second half of 
1976; R. Devlin, "External finance and commercial banks", 
CEPAL Review, N." 5, first half of 1978 and "Commercial 
bank finance from the North and the economic develop-
ment of the South: congruence and conflict", which 
appears in the present issue of CEPAL Review. 
has been assumed here that the combination of 
direct investment and transnational enter-
prises (which ofcourse has projections on to the 
financial level) has more significance from a 
structuralist point of view.27 
From the comparative viewpoint of the 
continuity and contrasts between the experi-
ence of the past and that subsequent to the 
Second World War, the interesting points in 
this connexion are those connected with the 
growth rates and forms of capital movements, 
the spatial distribution of the resources and 
their sources, and their sectoral destination, all 
of which are essential considerations for ap-
praising their incidence on the general ques-
tion under consideration. 
27It should, however, be noted that the changes in the 
composition of the loans —highlighted in the studies 
referred to— involving an increase in the share of private 
lenders and borrowers at the expense of the share ac-
counted for by loans made by governments or international 
agencies to other governments or public sectors also 
constitute a significant structural modification, although of 
more uncertain durability. 
Table 6 
WORLD CUMULATIVE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
AND IN T H E VARIOUS DEVELOPING REGIONS 
World investment 
Investment by United States 
Investment in the developed countries 
Investment in the developing countries 
In Europe1 ' 
In Africa 
In Asia 
In the Middle East 
In Latin America 
(23 countries plus other territories) 




Millions of dollars 




































































Source: CEPAL/CTC, Documento de Trabajo N.° 12, September 1978. 
"Not including the Middle East. 
^Including Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Spain, Turkey and Yugos-
lavia. 
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As regards growth rates, there is no infor-
mation which permits a proper comparison of 
the experience of the two periods, although 
there are significant data on their vigour in the 
first of these periods.28 We shall have to 
content ourselves, then, with the information 
collected for a relatively recent period, which 
is presented in table 6 and figure 1. What im-
mediately stands out is the overall growth rate 
of almost 12% per year, which is more than 
that cited above for the world product and 
exports (see table 2). 
T h e rate of growth is strongest in the cen-
tral countries, particularly in Europe, and in 
Asia (almost 17% per year), due to the well-
l-iguro I 
WORLD CUMULATIVE'! DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE DEVELOPED 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(Millions of dollars) 
lo i ¡il 
'////A 
'< 
Dl^vl Oping ciiLUlIri;-. 
^ S e e the important study prepared by CEPAL in 1965, 
External financing in Latin America, E/CN.12/649/Rev. 1; 
Sales N.° : E.65.II.G.4. 
known weight of the small group of industrial 
exporting economies. In contrast, the rate for 
Latin America is slower, although it rises some-
what in the case of Brazil and Mexico.29 
As regards the spatial distribution of the 
export of capital and the sources from which it 
came, the situation in the nineteenth century 
was very clear. Despite the considerable repre-
sentation of centre-periphery trade, the truth is 
that during this period the predominant move-
ments of capital were the horizontal circulation 
within Europe and to the United States and 
Canada and the vertical circulation to the 
British colonies. Argentina was the most con-
spicuous exception to this, for well-known 
reasons.30 If this country is excluded, about 
two-thirds of the total investment around 1913 
was concentrated in the first group.31 This fact, 
and the scanty mobility of the peripheral labour 
force to the centres, were the main reasons for 
the frustration of the classical optimism about 
the dynamizing and homogenizing effects 
which would be caused by the expansion of 
industrial capitalism to the exterior. 
Developments after the war confirmed 
this tendency and structure: the rapid growth 
of the total accumulated direct investment was 
concentrated mainly in the developed econo-
mies, whose share rose from 66.6% in the first 
year mentioned to 72% in the second (see 
table 6). 
It is also interesting to examine the unfold-
ing of this inclination from other viewpoints. 
As regards the origin of the flow, the su-
premacy of the British source of supply in the 
2 y I t should IXJ borne in mind that a considerable part 
oí the accumulated value is accounted for by the reinvest-
ment oí profits made in the same country. A study on the 
situation regarding United States investments showed that 
such reinvestment of profits represented a little over 50% of 
the cumulative total between 1966 and 1976. See US 
Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, 
Washington, August 1977. 
30A. Ferrer, in La economía argentina (Mexico City, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1963), notes: "From the 
second half oí the nineteenth century onwards, Argentina 
received a substantial proportion of the flow of capital ... to 
the developing areas ... the capital invested in this country 
rose from practically nothing in 1860 to 2.5 billion dolíais 
at today's prices (1962) in 1904 and nearly 10,5 billion 
dollars in 1913. 
3 1
 A. Lewis, op. cit. 
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first historical scenario was subsequently re-
placed by another and perhaps even more over-
whelming one, that of the United States, until 
well into the post-war era. Subsequently, how-
ever, the full recovery of Europe and Japan 
undermined this dominance, as is shown by 
the reduction of the United States share during 
the most recent phase from 53.8% in 1967 to 
48% in 1975.32 
It is also interesting to take into account the 
distribution of investments in the periphery 
(see table 6). In the light of its share of world 
population (a little over 10%, compared with 
3 1 % for Asia (excluding Japan and Israel) anda 
little over 12% for Africa (excluding South 
Africa), the large share of Latin Americais quite 
striking. At the same time, however, quite apart 
from the considerable decline during the peri-
od under examination, it is essential to take 
into account the countries in which these 
investments are made. Thus, Brazil and Mex-
ico, which accounted for about a third of the 
total in 1967, came to account for half by 1976. 
As in world trade, the sectoral structure of 
investments inclines towards the industrial 
field, in contrast with the past, when it was 
preferentially oriented towards mining and 
basic services. This is due to the influence 
both of the dynamics of the sector and the post-
war tendencies which favoured the nation-
alization of the previously dominant areas. The 
variations are appreciable even if we only take 
the relatively brief period between 1967 and 
1975, during which —as regards the capital 
accumulated by the United States— industry's 
share in Latin America rose from 33% to 49%, 
whi le the share of the petroleum and mining 
sectors dropped from 4 1 % to 19%.33 Partial 
3 2 O n e of the most significant elements in this develop-
men t is the growth of foreign investment in the United 
States. From an average of some 923 million dollars in 
1967-1969, this rose to almost 4 billion dollars per year 
in 1973-1975, according to information from the United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, TNCs in 
world development: a re-examination (United Nations 
publication, Sales N.°: E.78.II.A.5), 20 March 1978. 
Regarding the decline of the United States dominance, 
see inter alia L G. Franko, "Multinationals: the end of 
US dominance" in Harvard Business Review, Boston, 
Massachusetts, November-December 1978. 
3 3 See CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America, 
1977, up. cit. The other sector where there was rapid 
expansion in the recent past was that of finance, the share 
data give grounds for assuming that this ten-
dency is even more pronounced in the case of 
European capital.34 
h) The weight of the transnational enterprises 
It is generally agreed that an overwhelming 
proportion of direct investment is made by the 
transnational enterprises: consequently, there 
is no need to repeat or enlarge on here what 
has already been observed from examination 
of the tendencies and structures of invest-
ments. We shall therefore concentrate on dis-
cussing some qualitative elements which may 
help to identify the present character of the 
phenomenon, compared with similar situations 
in the past,35 the aim being to make a better 
appraisal of the role of these enterprises in the 
internationalization process since the end of 
the war. 
The magnitude of this phenomenon must 
be underl ined from the very start. According to 
a well-known United Nations study, around 
1971 a relatively limited number of parent 
corporations (7,276) and their subsidiaries 
(27,300) generated about one-fifth of the total 
value added in the world gross product, not 
counting the centrally planned economies.36 
Comparable data regarding Latin America 
are not available, but perhaps the most impor-
tant consideration is that involving a well 
documented fact: that the transnational corpo-
rations play the leading and sometimes exclu-
sive role in some key sectors of production 
—precisely those of greatest dynamism and 
highest technological level— just as occurred 
in the past with the primary commodity export-
ing complex. 
There is considerable documentation re-
of which rose from 14% to 20% of the total, for well-known 
reasons. 
-^In the case of West Germany, for example, it would 
appear that 77% of the total investment are in the industrial 
sector, according to the United Nations study Multina-
tional corporations in world development (Sales N.° : 
E.73.II.A.11), 1973. 
3 5With regard to the existence of such situations, 
Professor A. Lewis comments —rather ironically— that the 
recent discovery of their existence by political theorists 
leaves the historian a little perplexed (A. Lewis, op. cit.). 
3 6United Nations, Multinational corporations..., op. 
cit. 
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garding this matter which makes it unnecessary 
to go into it here in detail. It does seem useful, 
however, to go into a little more detail about 
some common features and also some notable 
differences in the particular situations of the 
Latin American countries. In order to do this, 
we have taken data regarding the industrial 
sector in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico.37 
In all these countries, from an early stage, 
foreign participation has been relatively high-
est (between 50 and 100%) in the chemical, 
basic metals and metal manufactures and ma-
chinery industries, with the proportions vary-
ing according to the specific lines in each sub 
sector. While the smaller degree of diversifica-
tion and development of Colombian manufac-
turing may explain some of the contrasts noted, 
it is nonetheless true that these are very marked 
compared with the situations in Brazil and 
Mexico. As regards the metal manufactures 
and machinery group, for example, foreign 
control in various main items in the second 
country was complete until at least 1970 (the 
last year of the study quoted), but it was more 
varied and relatively smaller in Brazil. The 
motor industry may be taken as an illustration: 
even when the terminal plants are foreign 
owned, domestic motor-component firms ac-
count for about one-third of the total sales in 
this branch.38 
Obviously —and beyond any value judge-
ment— the situation sketched above implies 
decisive influence on the growth rates and 
orientation of the production systems and on 
one of the crucial links of the external relations 
of the countries, precisely where this is most 
important. 
It is difficult to say categorically whether 
this new form of internationalization implies 
more or less dependence on the exterior than 
that which characterized the primary commod-
ity exporting growth. This is not the place to go 
3 7Regarding Brazil, see the data collected by the 
CEPAL/CTC Unit; regarding Colombia, see Michael 
Mortimore, CEPAL/CTC Unit, Foreign participation in 
Colombian development: the role of TNCs, 1979, and 
regarding Mexico, see C. Bazdresch Parada, "La política 
actual hacia la inversión extranjera directa", Comercio 
Exterior, Mexico City, November 1972. 
•^Dercio G. Muñoz, "Capitais extranjeiros — a espera 
de pragmatismo", in Revista de Anpec, N.° 2, 1978. 
into the terms of the controversy over this 
matter, but what does seem to be beyond doubt 
is that the phenomenon involved is much more 
complex and comprehensive than the previous 
type of linkage.39 
i) The 'motivations' of the transnational 
corporations 
What are the forces or motivations which im-
pelled this process? 
If we look back over the way the problem 
was expressed in the previous system of trade, 
it seems obvious that the central impulse came 
from the need to promote exports of primary 
commodities so as to ensure supplies of food 
and raw materials at relatively low prices 
(which, among other things reduced the cost 
of the labour force), while at the same time 
opening up other profitable horizons for die 
export of capital. 
In the post-war phase, these incentives 
continued to be present, but other conditioning 
factors also entered into the matter. One of 
them arises from technological development 
and the tendencies towards the concentration 
of enterprises, which created the possibility 
and necessity of going beyond national bound-
aries. 
With regard to the first and most decisive 
element, it seems unnecessary to stress the 
influence of progress made in the fields of com-
39Without this constituting an answer to this query, it 
seems useful to recall that in various recent CEPAL studies 
prominence has been given to the bigger capacity of the 
region to defend itself against the cycle of the central 
economies, which can be explained in the final analysis 
by the greater diversification of production of many of 
the economies of the region. When referring to this topic 
in his statement at the eighteenth session of CEPAL, the 
Executive Secretary of the Commission emphasized the 
following relevant aspects: the greater structural solidify 
of the economies of the region, due basically to the 
diversification of their production apparatus thanks to 
industrialization; the more diversified structure of exports 
and, in particular, the increase in exports of manufactures; 
the domestic potential for producing intermediate and 
capital goods, which could previously only be obtained 
through imports; the greater access to international financ-
ing (above all of a private nature), even at times of serious 
balance-of-payments disequilibrium in some countries, 
and the limited but significant changes in agriculture and 
particularly in a modernized sector with quite a high 
growth rate. 
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munications and transport, cybernetics, and 
business management, to which was added the 
"capacity and ... technical skill to 'fragmentize' 
the productive processes, even in relatively 
more complex activities, separating the seg-
ments of higher labour density from those 
which, although characterized by high capital 
density, can be carried out by unskilled or 
semi-skilled workers".40 
To these familiar reasons are added some 
others from other sources which complement 
them and accentuate problems connected with 
"capitalist accumulation' ' , especially the un-
satisfactory tendencies of profit rates in the 
centres (although this question only became of 
importance in the present decade), the pres-
sure of the organized working class of the 
central countries themselves to share in the 
advances in productivity, and also the alterna-
tive and compensatory attraction of the low 
wages paid in the periphery. 
Without denying the degree of validity of 
this second group of explanations, it seems 
clear that it comes from the same stock as the 
classical assumptions on this matter which we 
referred to earlier through a quotation from 
Professor Rosenstein-Rodan. As regards speci-
fically the attraction exerted by the lower 
wages paid on the periphery, it is necessary to 
recall once again the well-proven fact that the 
bulk of the investments of the central countries 
has been concentrated in their own sphere 
—i.e., precisely where substantially higher 
wages predominate— and that even in the pe-
riphery itself they tend to recruit workers at 
wages which are usually higher than the aver-
age, although obviously they are far below 
those prevailing in the industrialized econo-
mies.41 
A sounder approach, therefore, is to take 
into account the generic reasoning over the 
4 ( )P, Vuskovic, "América Latina ante nuevos términos 
d e la división internacional del trabajo", in the review 
Economía de America Latina, C IDE, Mexico City, March 
1979. 
4 1
 From the point of view of Marxist categories, it could 
be said that the extraction oí the relative surplus value 
(conditioned by the differential growth rates oí produc-
tivity and wages) has been more attractive than the 
extraction of the absolute surplus value (created by the 
intensification of the efforts of workers and/or the com-
pression of wages). 
possibilities of profit—visible or hidden profit 
on inter-enterprise transfers, payments for 
technology rights, and other well-known 
tricks— which acquires even greater signifi-
cance if we consider the global or supranational 
strategies and the logic behind the oligopolistic 
competition between the big corporations. In 
other words, what interests them is not so much 
the profitability of each investment in particular 
as the global effect over the whole of their 
profits and the situation as regards competition 
with similar firms in the same field. 
j) The export of capital and the production 
cycle 
T h e elements of continuity and change in the 
presence of the transnational enterprises and 
their investments give rise to other queries 
which lead us to ask, as was done in a study 
already referred to: what is really new, if there 
is indeed anything new, in the recent trends?42 
In this sense, for some analysts the former 
phase was characterized by the export of capital 
from the central economies, while the phase 
which began after the Second World War was 
distinguished by the "internationalization of 
the production cycle"43 or, to put it another 
way, by "the incorporation of the labour forces 
of many countries into an integrated and corpo-
rate world production structure"44 in which 
the transnational enterprises play a decisive 
role. 
Without denying the substantial change 
which took place between the two periods as 
regards the composition of the flows of capital, 
this did not prevent the fact that in the first 
stage, and even long before, as in the revealing 
case of the sugar plantations of the West Indies 
and Brazil, the other phenomenon mentioned 
above also took place. Particularly from the 
end of the nineteenth century onwards, there 
was a considerable increase in the centre-
periphery links based on the trading of raw 
4 2 P . Vuskovic, up. cit. 
4 3 C. Palloix, "Impérialisme et mode d'accumulation 
international du capital", Revue Tiers Monde, Paris, 
January-March 1974. Quoted by Pedro Vuskovic, op. cit. 
4 4 S . Hymer, "The internationalization of capital", 
Journal of Economic Issues, Lincoln, Nebraska, March 
1972. 
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materials and food for manufactures, thus in-
ternationalizing the global production cycle 
through the reciprocal significance of the flows 
of goods and capital involved. Obviously, the 
centre laid down the forms and rates of the 
links, but the mainly endogenous nature of 
their functioning was not in contradiction to 
the minor but still strategic role of the periph-
eral universe which was incorporated in this 
relationship and whose growth was 
subordinated to its rate and forms. 
Moreover, this evolution, as a logical cor-
ollary of the direct or indirect promotion and 
control of production units by the guiding 
economies, also meant the forced or sponta-
neous mobilization and recruitment of an enor-
mous reserve of labour. As is well known, two 
enormous international migration movements 
were set afoot: the approximately 50 million 
people who left Europe had as their counter-
part a similar number of people who left the 
periphery for the tropical plantations, the 
mines or the construction projects. Added to 
the migrants were many more millions of 
people who were incorporated into the primary 
commodity export activities in their own lands. 
These amounts seem to be considerably greater 
than those now estimated with regard to the 
foreign operations of the transnational enter-
prises.45 
While the thesis thus unravelled may give 
rise to valid objections, it is nonetheless true 
that it does point to a clear and main fact: the 
greater complexity of the pattern of interna-
tional relations (intra-centre and centre-pe-
riphery) established by the present agents in 
the articulation process. The socialization of 
economic activities (and not only of these ac-
tivities) shows a great advance under the si-
multaneously paradoxical and contradictory 
aegis of the transnational corporations, which 
are private but in whose activities para-State 
and government bodies also play a part. 
k) The internalization of investments 
In seeking the novel features of the new situa-
tion it may be usef'ull to recall the well known 
4 5 S . Hyrnur, op. cit., calculated that the foreign 
employees of the 500 biggest United States firms amount 
image of Hans Singer who, referring to foreign 
investment in the primary commodity export-
ing field, maintained that it was umbilically 
rooted in the central country which gave rise 
to it, whereas its link with the peripheral 
country was a factor more of geographic than 
economic significance.46 
This picture underwent a profound change 
in the period after 1945. As foreign investment 
abandoned or was displaced from the field of 
commodity exports and began to be concen-
trated in industry and other activities, an 
"internalization" process took place to a de-
gree which was more or less significant but in 
any case undoubtedly greater than in the past. 
The basic reason for this fact, as we know very 
well, is that the enterprises came to depend on 
the domestic market for their profitability and 
expansion, although they continued to be sub-
ordinated to the exterior through various chan-
nels (imports of inputs and capital, technolog-
ical subjection, finance, etc.). On the other 
hand, depending on the host countries' bar-
gaining power, this was accompanied by an 
expansion of the manoeuvring capacity of 
national policies and even the emergence of 
new forms of linkage with the transnational 
enterprises.47 
This "internalization" has many important 
consequences. One of them is the bigger ir-
radiation of its effects over the societies which 
act as hosts to such enterprises, extending from 
the intensification and extension of the dem-
onstration effect, with the consequent repro-
duction of the consumption patterns of the 
transmitting centres, to social and political 
impacts. It has been convincingly argued that 
all this has increased the co-optation capacity 
of the foreign presence, which covers the po-
litical, business and wage-earning classes, to 
to between 13 and 14 million persons, while C. Vaitsos, 
op. cit., estimates the number of persons employed by the 
transnational enterprises in industries ¡n the developing 
countries at between 2.5 and 4 million. 
4 ( iHans Singer, "The distribution of gains between 
investing and borrowing countries", in American Eco-
nomic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Nashville, Ten-
nessee, Vol. II . N." 2, May 1950. 
4 7 See in this respect CEPAL, The economic and social 
development and external economic relations of Latin 
America (E/CEPAL/1024), Vol. II, 1979. Prominent among 
these new forms are: co-production and specialization 
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say nothing of that part of the population which 
is incorporated (or hopes to be incorporated) 
in the market for consumer goods which are 
characteristic of the process. Paradoxically, in 
consequence, this "internalization" becomes 
a force which activates the tendencies towards 
internationalization already referred to. 
Without prejudice to the foregoing, it is 
clear that these impulses run counter to other 
very powerful impulses in the opposite direc-
tion: i.e., towards the absolute or relative (but 
in any case conflictive) exclusion of a consider-
able part of the population of the periphery, 
with the proportions varying according to the 
particular situations of the countries, as many 
studies have convincingly demostrated.48 
There is no room here to go into greater 
detail on this topic of such outstanding impor-
tance, but we cannot proceed without stopping 
to speak about a manifestation which is new in 
this matter and which is of particular signifi-
cance for the central discussion. 
Going to the root of the matter, we must 
recall the undoubted export-orientation of the 
former system of investment, which had as its 
counterpart—and made possible— the flow in 
the reverse direction represented by imports 
and service payments on foreign capital. 
T h e new circumstances, and particularly 
the "internalization" mentioned, radically 
changed this circuit. With the international 
enterprises transformed into the main actors in 
the so-called second phase of substitution 
industrialization (which only really flourished 
it may be noted in passing, in the larger coun-
tries of Latin America), the trend towards im-
ports replaced the former export trend. 
Some selective data make it possible to 
illustrate this phenomenon: although they re-
fer to changes which took place after 1950 they 
nevertheless bear witness to the change which 
agreements; sub-contracting; co-operation arrangements 
l imited to aspects of technology and marketing, and agree-
ments between foreign and domestic enterprises to carry 
out joint ventures. 
4f
*Among these studies, those concerning income 
distribution and situations of extreme poverty and on the 
subject of basic needs are particularly pertinent. See, for 
example, CEPAL, The economic and social development 
and external economic relations of Latin America, 1979, 
op. cit., vol. 1. 
With regard to the general phenomenon of integradon-
took place in the period within the general 
framework of inward-oriented development. 
Thus, for example, if we compare the 
growth rates of the domestic product and of 
the imports of Latin America in the period 
1950-1960 with those for 1965-1974 (see table 
7), we see that in the second period there was 
a substantial rise in the growth rate of imports, 
while there was only a relatively modest in-
crease in the product. The same evolution is 
repeated with greater force in the large coun-
tries in which the second stage of substitution 
was concentrated, since in these countries the 
growth rate of purchases abroad increased four-
fold. 
Table 7 
GROWTH RATES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTS AND IMPORTS 
Latin America Large countries 
as a whole of Latin America 
1950-1960 1965-1974 1950-1960 1965-1974 
Domestic 
product 5.2 6.7 5.4 7.5 
Imports 3.5 9.4 2.8 12.2 
Exports 4.0 4.6 3.1 6.2 
Source: CEPAL, Long-term trends and prospects of the 
development of Latin America (E/CEPAL/1076), 
document presented at the eighteenth session of 
CEPAL in La Paz, Bolivia, 1979. 
Of course these disparities are not due 
exclusively to the phenomenon under consid-
eration. They are also influenced by t h e ex-
pansion in world trade and the relative im-
provement of the terms of trade noted in the 
second period (1965-1974). At the same time, 
however, it should be noted that the average 
growth rates of the region's exports are similar 
in both periods, although they increase ap-
preciably for the bigger countries, largely 
because of the performance of Brazil. External 
indebtedness consequently assumes outstand-
ing importance in explaining the difference in 
the growth rates of the two flows. 
exclusion, the studies by Osvaldo Sunkel, "Capitalismo 
transnacional y desintegración nacional" in El Trimestre 
Económico, Mexico City, N.° 150, and by S. Hymer, op. 
cit., are worthy of mention. 
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This matter is made clearer if we look at 
fragmentary figures on the relation between 
exports and imports (and financial payments) 
for the case of Brazil, where the phenomena 
under consideration are to be seen more cl early 
and significantly affect the fields selected. 
A study carried out by the Ministry of Plan-
ning of Brazil, which refers to the year 1974 
and to 115 of the main transnational enter-
prises, revealed that the trade balance of the 
latter showed a negative balance of 2,161 mil-
lion dollars,49 which rises to 2,412 million 
dollars on the current account (i.e., taking into 
account payments for services) and which is 
reduced to 1,731 million dollars if we take into 
account investments and loans under the 
movement of capitals. From the point of view 
of the current account, this balance is equiva-
lent to one-third of the total deficit recorded for 
1974 (7,286 million dollars).50 
It hardly seems necessary to stress the 
great importance of the structural turnabout in 
the internal and external projections of the 
activities of these corporations. For a start, it 
raises a clear contradiction between the need 
for foreign exchange and the inward effects on 
the level and composition of domestic demand, 
which stimulates an increase in imports. More-
over, it obviously represents an obstacle to the 
progress of the internationalization of the econ-
omy (or, if you prefer, its "transnational iza-
tion"), insofar as it makes payments on foreign 
capital and the growth of imports more dif-
ficult. New net investments and an increase in 
other exports and credits can obviously make 
up for this dissociation to some extent, but their 
growth capabilities suggest that only a change 
in the structure of external relations of these 
enterprises —in the direction of increasing 
their export trends— could restore a manage-
able level of harmony to the opposing trends ifj 
of course, these are going to continue playing 
such a decisive role as in the recent past. 
Be that as it may, the change in question 
seems to imply that, in the second historical 
period under consideration, foreign enter-
49The exports of the 115 enterprises totalled 837.5 
million dollars as against 3,000 million dollars of imports. 
mSee SUBIN, Ministerio de Planejamento, Balanco 
de Pagamentos de 115 empresas multinacionais, Brasilia, 
prises or investments did not so much contrib-
ute to the progress and change of the interna-
tional division of labour as help to deepen 
national divisions in this, i.e., within each 
country, as expressed in movements of labour 
and capital between and within the productive 
sectors. Of course, the outlook would be dif-
ferent if we forgot about the national frame-
work and took as our reference a unified world 
system. From that point of view, this inward-
directed change would have a sense equal to 
that of the international division of labour as it 
is normally understood. 
1) Oil and internationalization 
It would be a serious omission not to include 
some brief remarks about the incidence of the 
change in oil prices on the question under 
examination. Although the difficulties of the 
world economy, and particularly those of the 
central countries, had already begun to show 
themselves earlier,51 there can be no doubt 
that this price rise has been of decisive impor-
tance in the second half of the nineteen-seven-
ties and it seems that it will be even more im-
portant in the future. 
The truth is that this abrupt change gave 
rise to universal awareness of the realities of 
internationalization (and interdependence), 
however their nature and content might be 
viewed. 
It may be, as has been suggested, that this 
was simply the detonator which dramatically 
brought to the surface the various disequilibria 
generated by the kind of development fol-
lowed since the war, but at the same time few 
will deny that it has a personality of its own and 
effects which go far beyond the mere moment 
of the explosion. 
For the particular purposes of the present 
study, what is worth stressing more than any-
thing is the fact that this episode constitutes 
the first and unprecedented case in which the 
impulse towards internationalization —with 
all the consequences which it involves— has 
originated from a decision of a sector of the 
1976, and CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latín America, 
1976, op. cit. 
5 iSee in this connexion the analysis which appeared 
in CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1971, op. 
cit. 
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periphery, thanks to its partial but strategic 
domination and handling of a product which is 
essential for modern society and especially for 
the most highly industrialized core of that 
society. 
Many appraisals shared by analysts of 
diverse and opposed tendencies probably 
exaggerate the negative repercussions oí this 
phenomenon and underestimate, in contrast, 
the capacity of adaptation of the centres. There 
seems to be general agreement, however, that 
the adjustment process (quite apart from hav-
ing a striking influence on the growth rate, 
inflation and the terms of trade) may involve 
substantial changes in their style of develop-
men t and, more specifically, in their resource 
assignment matrix. Recalling an oft-repeated 
metaphor, it could be said that the type of econ-
omy based on oil at less than 2 dollars a barrel 
can hardly be the same when the price in mid-
1979 is already over 20 dollars.52 A more direct 
and equally transcendental result could be the 
massive reallocation of investments called for 
by energy programmes. 
All this raises great queries which are far 
from being clarified, but their consideration 
goes beyond the scope of the present study, 
except as regards the repercussions of the 
general phenomenon on the periphery and the 
reactions of the industrialized economies. 
A contradictory aspect inmediately comes 
to our attention in this respect. There can lie 
no doubt that the rise in oil prices represented 
a global strengthening of the bargaining posi-
tion of the periphery vis-à-vis the centres, and 
this is the main reason for the political solidari-
ty which is to be observed within the group of 
peripheral countries with regard to the OPEC. 
On the other hand, however, as is even clearer, 
it represented a differentiating and weakening 
factor in this group in view of the contrast 
which it created between die oil-exporting 
5 2 S e e J. W. Mullen, "World oil prices: prospects and 
implications for energy policy-makers in Latin America's 
oil-deficit countries", Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Santiago, 
Chi le , 1978. In practice, the price of a barrel of oil before 
the 1973 increase, in constant 1975 dollars, was equivalent 
to less than half that prevailing at the beginning of the 
1950s. It would be difficult to find a more eloquent 
illustration of the historic short-sightedness of the "market 
forces". 
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countries and those dependent on the importa-
tion of petroleum.53 
Moreover, if we look at the situation of the 
latter countries, it is easy to see the multitude 
of negative consequences following upon the 
rise in fuel prices and transmitted from the 
central economies, the most readily visible of 
which are those deriving from "stagflation"; 
weakening of demand for the non-oil countries' 
exports, rises in the prices of their imports, 
and in addition the recrudescence of protec-
tionism. In the more distant future, however, 
there loom other disquieting factors also, such 
as those which may result from the changes in 
die patterns of growth and investment already 
referred to.54 
Without weighing the various positive and 
negative elements against each other, there is 
a striking contrast between the effective 
impulse towards internationalization repre-
sented by the oil problem and the contrary 
influences —towards marginalization— which 
affect in particular the oil-importing peripheral 
economies.55 
Looking at the same problem from the 
angle of the central countries, we also note a 
contradictory situation. On the one hand, the 
energy crisis has so far stimulated joint deci-
sions for tackling it, but few would deny that 
if it persists or gets worse this could well be 
the source of future conflicts. 
(m) A structural balance-sheet 
In order to give a broad picture of the changes 
which the internationalization process has 
5 3 The first open manifestation of this split was seen at 
the UNCTAD Conference held in Manila in 1979. 
,54By way of illustration, we may consider a tendency 
which was already taking shape before the oil crisis. Thus, 
be tween 1970 and 1973 over 80% of the total expenditure 
on the exploration of mineral resources was concentrated 
in only four countries; the United States, Canada, Australia 
and South Africa. See United Nations, Development 
Forum, Geneva, May 1978. 
5 5 The so-called recycling of the oil surpluses and their 
contribution to international liquidity facilitated the flow of 
credits to tlie non-oil-exporting economies, and some 
measures have also been taken by the oil-producing 
countries to reduce tlie difficulties of the former. It is 
obvious, however, that these elements are far from repre-
senting adequate solutions to tlie problem, On the other 
hand, the allocation of a large part of the OPEC countries' 
resources to investments and purchases in the central 
economies has significantly aided the latter. 
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he lped to bring about, two approaches have 
been selected. One stresses the changes in the 
pattern of trade of the main groupings in the 
world system, while the other stresses the 
structural shifts in the centre-periphery 
complex in its usual sense, i.e., without taking 
into account the socialist economies, although 
details are given regarding them. 
With regard to the first approach, an 
attempt is made to establish to what degree 
there has been a change in the "classic" 
division between exporters of commodities 
and exporters of manufactures. See in this 
respect table 8, prepared for a recent CEPAL 
study, which clearly illustrates this matter. 
As may be seen, there is a clear predom-
inance of industrial exports in the export 
structures of the central economies and the 
European Socialist countries. In contrast, 
despi te the significant changes which took 
place between the years in question, industrial 
exports represent only a small fraction of the 
sales of the peripheral countries, although the 
Asian market economies constitute a signifi-
cant exception to this because of the well-
known weight of the group of countries which 
began their industrialization process with a 
view to the external market. 
The situation is very different if we look at 
the composition of imports, since in all cases 
(with the exception of Japan)56 imports of 
manufactures clearly predominate. This situa-
tion, of course, implies a marked distortion in 
the external trade structure of the periphery 
because of the scanty relative weight of their 
industrial exports in comparison with the very 
high value of their imports of such goods. In 
contrast, the symmetry in the imports and 
56This situation is largely explained by the shortage 
of natural resources. It is also influenced, however, by 
policies restricting the access of industrial products, which 
are frequently criticized, it may be noted in passing, by 
those who claim to be adversely affected by these policies. 
Table 8 
RELATIVE VALUE OF MANUFACTURES3 IN WORLD AND REGIONAL TRADE 
IN GOODS (EXCLUDING FUELS), 1955 and 1975 
(Percentages) 
World 
North America (Canada 
and USA) 
Western Europe 
Eastern Europe and USSR 
Japan 
Other developed countries1' 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Africa (excluding South Africa) 
Asia (excluding Japan and Asian 
socialist countries 
















































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of data from UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 
1976 (United Nations publications, Sales N.°: E/F.76.II.D.3) and 1977 (Sates N.°: E/F.78.II.D.1). 
;
'SITC sections 5, 6, 7 and 8, except for division 68 (non-ferrous metals). Figures based on FOB values. 
''Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. 
uNorth Korea, Mongolia and the former Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. 
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exports of the central economies in this respect 
is very clear.57 
In view of the decisive role which exports 
of commodities will continue to play in the 
periphery and in Latin America, it is worth 
referring again here to an aspect which was 
already mentioned and which is of essential 
importance within the CEPAL conceptions of 
the centre-periphery system. We refer to the 
different demand dynamics for the goods 
which make up foreign trade and their influ-
ence on its structure. As we can see from table 
3, between 1960 and 1974 the growth rate of 
industrial exports —at constant values— was 
two and a half times higher than the rate for 
primary commodities and foodstuffs, although 
it was not so much higher than that for fuels. 
In order to try to draw up a balance from 
the other angle, we assembled and rearranged 
known data which enable the situations in 1930 
and 1977 to be compared. These are given in 
table 9. As already noted, the socialist area has 
been excluded for the basic reason that it does 
not form part of this group, although it is linked 
to it by various channels and does form part of 
the world picture. Furthermore, this exclusion 
was due to more substantive reasons connected 
with the particular characteristics of these 
economies, which are based on collective, or, 
according to some, State ownership and 
planning, and with their internal or regional 
relations in the case of the USSR and the 
countries of Eastern Europe.58 Reference will 
be made to their evolution later in this study. 
Table 9 
CENTRE AND PERIPHERY: DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, TOTAL PRODUCT AND PER CAPITA 
PRODUCT IN 1950 AND 1977 
Centre and periphery" 
" M o d e r n " sector 
North Ameri ta (Canada and USA) 
Western Europe11 
Japan 
Other developed countries*-' 
" In te rmed ia te" sector 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
"Pr imi t ive" sector 
Africa (excluding South Africa) 
















































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis oí data taken from official United Nations publications. 
"Includes only market economies and therefore excludes the centrally planned economies of Europe, Asia and Cuba. 
All the EEC and EFTA countries, Greece, Malta and Spain. 
'•'Australia, Israel, New Zealand and South Africa. 
5 7 See in this respect G. Fichet and Norberto González, 
"The production structure and the dynamics of develop-
men t" , in CEPAL Review, N.° 2, second half of 1976. 
^ W i t h regard to the second element, it should be 
stressed that this group of countries, despite some simi-
larities with the centre-periphery scheme of the capitalist 
sphere (such as the fact that there is a "main centre" and 
other economies which are dependent on it in essential 
aspects), there are differences in other important aspects, 
such as the feet that the "classic" system of trade between 
exporters of industrial goods and exporters of basic 
commodities does not apply. In practice, the main producer 
of primary commodities is the USSR, and some of the 
smaller countries have an economic structure which is 
more homogeneous and "developed" than the "main 
centre" . For a longer and more fully documented discus-
sion of this subject, see A. Pinto and J. Kñakal, América 
Latina y el cambio en la economía mundial, Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1973. 
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As will be noted, the statistical picture 
reflects the approach applied in Latin America 
for characterizing the structural heterogeneity 
of the region.59 This procedure is not arbitrary, 
since a similar picture is to be observed at the 
world level, where several outstanding univer-
ses coexist and are interrelated: that of the 
predominantly prosperous countries (in rela-
tive terms and with the exception of some 
special cases which are of little significance 
for the group as a whole); that of the predomi-
nantly backward or poor countries (except for 
the case of small rich élites which are also of 
little significance for the total), and that of the 
countries which are "intermediate" in the 
Latin American style, namely, countries which 
are neither one thing nor the other because 
they contain markedly heterogeneous produc-
tive strata which represent significant propor-
tions of the population and/or the product. 
The global system then, resembles the 
Latin American formation in its structure. A 
modern sector (the central economies) ac-
counts for a high proportion of the product and 
a low proportion of the population; the "primi-
tive" sector (Asia and Africa)60 is marked by the 
opposite features, while the intermediate 
sector (Latin America) shows something of a 
balance between the two positions (see ta-
ble 9).61 
5 9Paraphrasing one of Marshall Wolfe's definitions 
(CEPAL, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1973, p. 291) 
for this purpose, it could be said that this corresponds toa 
situation marked by the coexistence of economic groups 
characterized by profound differences of productivity and 
"moderni ty" but connected by complex links of trade, 
dominations and dependence within the world as a whole 
With regard to its application to Latin American analysis 
see inter alia A. di Filippo and S. Jadue, "La heteroge-
ne idad estructural: concepto y dimensiones", El Trimestre 
Económico, N.° 169, January-March 1976. 
^ I n order to facilitate the statement of this position, 
the oil-exporting countries have not been separated in 
these groupings. In any case, the comparisons are on the 
basis of the real product in money of constant value, so 
that they do not take into account the variations in fuel 
prices. 
6 1Another factor already referred to is the internal 
structure of Latin America. At the end of the 1960s, this 
was approximately as follows: the modern sector generated 
5 3 % of the product and gave employment to 12% of the 
labour force (not, it should b e noted, of the total popula-
tion); the figures for the intermediate sector were 48% and 
42%, respectively, while those for the "primitive" sector 
were 5% of the product and 34% of the labour force. 
The first element to consider is the expan-
sion of the system and of its parts, for which 
purpose we may look at the increase in the per 
capita product. What strikes us immediately 
from this point of view is the dynamic evolution 
of the whole and the different increases of each 
segment of this. Thus, while the global in-
crease was 83%, that of the centre exceeded 
126%, that corresponding to Latin America 
rose by 100%, and that of the most backward 
area by 105%.62 
Despite the significant contrasts, the 
intermediate and primitive sectors slightly 
improved their share in the total product at the 
expense of the modem sector. The variations in 
absolute terms, however, are extremely 
unequal (almost 2,000 dollars for the centre, 
almost 100 dollars for the most backward 
countries, and 365 dollars for Latin America).63 
It is easy to see that the change in the 
relative population of the areas affected this 
evolution. Thus, in keeping with well-known 
factors, the population growth rate of the 
industrialized economies went down consid-
erably, whereas that of the other groups went 
up. Clearly, however, this is only a minor factor 
compared with the centripetal tendencies of 
the system as regards the absorption of tech-
nical progress. 
Naturally, there are marked differences between coun-
tries. Argentina, for example, differs considerably from the 
general picture in that the "primitive" sector only accounts 
for 5% of the labour force, whereas the modern sector 
employs 2 1 % of the total labour. See in this respect A 
Pinto, "Styles oí development in Latin America" in CEPAL 
Review, first half of 1976. 
6 2
 The rates of annual increase were 2.3% for the whole, 
3.1% for the modern sector, 2.6% for the intermediate sector 
and 2.7% for the primitive sector. In order to have a point 
with which to compare these, they may be placed alongside 
the increases in the per capita product in the United States 
in a similar period of active expansion (1897-1900 to 1928-
1930), which came to 1.7% per year (US Bureau of the 
Census , Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial 
times to 1957, Washington, D.C., US Government Priting 
Office, 1960). 
^ T h e figures make possible a realistic appraisal of the 
references to Latin America as an international "middle 
class". Apart from the fundamental factor of the distribution 
of this increase by social classes and countries —which 
meant very small advances for the 50% of the population 
with the lowest income— the distance between Latin 
America and the levels of the centre is very much greater 
than that between Latin America and the most backward 
area. 
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It would be tiresome to go into all the 
details of the various aspects arising from the 
information presented, but it: seems useful to 
draw attention to the shifts within the modem 
sector, which confian the rise in the relative 
position of Western Europe and, in particular, 
of japan, whose per capita product increased 
seven-fold. This is obviously due largely to the 
year taken as a reference, when these areas 
were only beginning their period of post-war 
reconstruction. Moreover, even in 1977 the 
specific and proportional weight of the United 
States continues to be striking. 
In order to complete this balance-sheet, 
we include the information given in table 10, 
which shows the changes regarding the Euro-
pean Socialist countries. Even taking into 
account the year taken as a base, which like-
wise reflects the upsets of the war, the varia-
tions in all the indicators are still substantial; 
in this respect, it is sufficient to note that this 
group's share in the world product rose from a 
little over 12% in the base year to 23% in 1977, 
whi le their per capita product rose at an annual 
rate of 6% over the period in question.64 
Table 10 
RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN 
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY1 
(World = 100) 
1950 1977 
Population 14.8 12.2 
Total product 12.2 22.9 
Per capita product 82.0 189.0 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis oí data taken from official 
United Nations publications. 
"Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Yugoslavia) and the USSR. 
^ B y way of reservation regarding this evolution, it has 
been argued that the amount of expenditure on defence 
constitutes a larger part of the product than in the central 
capitalist economies and that the official exchange rates 
over-estimate the real significance of the figures; even so, 
however, the changes are substantial. 
Recapitulation 
As we have seen, the rate of internationaliza-
tion —except for the interval between the First 
World War and the end of the Second World 
War— undoubtedly accelerated during the 
second period, while the process also became 
more complex and all-embracing, especially at 
certain superstructural levels. From the more 
directly economic point of view, however, the 
process continued to be concentrated in the 
developed countries, as the driving forces and 
guides of the overall movement, whereas it 
took place in relatively few countries of the 
periphery and even then only in certain 
dynamic activities now closely linked to the 
consumption patterns of the central economies 
and the middle and upper groups. Thus, the 
phenomenon continued to be primarily hori-
zontal (North-South), selective with respect 
to the periphery (as regards countries, activi-
ties, social groups, spatial location, etc.), and, 
as a result, a source of relative or absolute 
marginalization in all these dimensions as far 
as the great majority of the world population is 
concerned. 
In short, the expectations regarding "the 
world-wide expansion of industrial capital-
ism"65 did not materialize, not so much be-
cause of overdoses of the supposed medi-
cine, but rather because these doses were 
insufficient or unsuitable for transforming the 
world economy in the image and likeness of 
the centres. 
As we already noted at the beginning of 
this study, we have not gone into the question 
of " in terdependence" which is so often in-
termingled with that of internationalization. 
This matter does, of course, involve related 
realities, and it can thus be maintained in 
general terms that tire development of the 
second process necessarily promotes the first 
situation, but the problem is considerably more 
complex than this in reality, due mainly to the 
ambiguity of the concept of interdependence. 
In order to go straight to the heart of the 
matter, let us recall one of the elements which 
form the backbone of the centre-periphery 
^ R , Prebisch, "Towards a theory of change", an 
unpublished study to appear soon in CEPAL Review. 
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theory formulated by Raúl Prebisch. As we 
know, he started from the analysis of the 
economic cycle and the dominating role of the 
"main centre of the cycle", reflected in the 
dependence of the peripheral countries. This 
analysis was progressively enriched through 
the identification of the structural contrasts 
which condition the links between the two 
spheres beyond the periodical fluctuations. 
Within the framework of this conception, the 
various functions discharged by the periphery 
for the development of the central countries are 
not ignored, but it is established beyond all 
doubt that it is the centres which impart their 
special features and dynamics to the evolution 
of the system as a whole and that of the 
periphery in particular.66 In other words, the 
overall interdependence has as its basis these 
two substantially different roles. 
The course of the processes since the war 
has not changed the essence of this composi-
tion: indeed, the world projections of the 
"stagflation" suffered by the centres is sufïï-
^ I n this connexion, see O. Rodriguez, "On the 
conception of the centre-periphery system", CEPAL 
Review, N.° 3, first half of 1977. 
ciently eloquent proof of this. Although there 
can be no doubt that the "oil challenge", 
which we discussed earlier, is a prime excep-
tion of great present and potential significance, 
it is no less true that it has also brought out the 
very different capacities for response and adap-
tation of the industrialized and peripheral 
economies. 
In reality, as Dr. Prebisch pointed out, this 
is a situation of interdependence between 
unequals.67 
The moral of the analysis which we have 
tried to make is clear. The dynamic continua-
tion of the process of internationalization is not 
enough to significantly alter the classic system 
of centre-periphery relations. For this, there 
must also be a profound change in the ways in 
which the peripheral countries are fitted into 
the world economy, and this, in its rum, is 
intimately connected with the shift in their 
own productive structures. There lies the nub 
of the discussions and policies on the New 
International Economic Order. 
67In his statement at the UNCTAD Conference in 
March 1979. 
